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I. Introduction 
During the 1990s, in most regions of the world, governments restructured their 
infrastructure sectors to facilitate some form of private participation in the operation and 
financing of the sector. These reforms, generally associated with other macroeconomic 
reforms which included the liberalization of international capital, goods and services flows 
have often initially produced significant flows of foreign direct investments flows to small 
countries. Overtime however they have also been associated with reversed flows, first of 
profits and later, as international financial crisis exploded, of capital repatriation that often 
put pressure on the service trade balances. These facts contribute to explain why trade in 
services are now at the top of the WTO agenda forum and point to the need to try to 
improve our understanding of the interactions between the privatisation of infrastructure 
monopolies and associated trade flows. 
Because regulatory issues are usually treated in partial equilibrium frameworks that 
ignore many of the indirect interactions of the regulated sectors with the rest of the 
economy,  a key, yet underestimated, policy issue in the sector is the effect that the specific 
choice of the regulatory regime imposed on the private infrastructure operators has on the 
trade balance.
 1 It seems indeed rational to expect that the recognition of the presence of a 
third party such as the rest of the world, exchanging goods and (capital) services with the 
regulated party is likely to influence the optimal contract between the regulator and the 
regulated operator.
2  
While there are a few studies of the impact of the choice of the regulatory regime 
on variables such as efficiency, equity or the fiscal balance, there are no studies of the 
                                                 
1 Reformers had the choice between three main forms of regulation: a price cap, a cost plus or a hybrid 
regime. In most cases, reformers have chosen to try to promote incentives for efficiency in these sectors 
rather than to guarantee return through cost plus regimes. In Latin America, according to a data base put 
together by Guasch (2003) on 954 concessions contracts awarded from the mid 1980s to 2000, 56% of the 
contracts were regulated under a price cap regime, 20% under rate of return regulation. For 24% of the 
contract, the regime is a hybrid one. 
2 These optimal contracts are typically modelled in a Principal-Agent framework in the regulation literature. 
For an overview see for instance Laffont and Martimort or Laffont and Tirole    3
interactions between the choice of the regulatory regime and the trade performance of a 
country.
3 
The main purpose of the paper is to help close that gap. We do so by analysing the 
experience of Argentina, the former poster boy of privatisation and the first country to 
have a rather encompassing reform of the infrastructure sector, through simulations of a 
general equilibrium model built to assess the impact of regulatory regimes on the trade 
balance.
4 
The structure of the paper is the following. First, we motivate the use of a general 
equilibrium approach to the analysis and explain why we believe that a Ricardo-Viner 
framework is a useful way of modelling the problem. Second,  we motivate the need to 
also model two of the key regulatory policy issues: service obligations imposed on 
operators for social reasons and restriction to entry often built-in long term contracts 
signed with these operators. In section III, we present the formal structure of the model; 
one version that includes tradable, regulated goods foreign goods and that also considers a 
wider class of non-tradable - paying attention to the rate of exchange defined 
endogenously. In section IV we present comparative static numerical explorations 
comparing the effects of price cap and or rate of return regulation.
5  W e  t h e n  d o  t h e  
simulations for two types of economies: a symmetric economy to provide a benchmark, 
and an economy with the basic asymmetric characteristics of the Argentine economy. 
Section VI considers explicitly the importance of unemployment, government intervention 
and external debt. Section VII compares an alternative mechanism of obligatory service: 
the use of a new technology. Section VIII summarizes the main findings of the paper . 
 
 
                                                 
3 Chisari et al (1999), Navajas (2000), and the papers included in Ugaz and Waddams (2003),   
4 To some extent, a rule for determining the tariff can be modelled as a distortion that modifies optimal trade 
policy (see Bhagwati et al. (2000), Ch.20). We are leaving aside the financial and temporal considerations; in 
fact, it could happen that a rate-of-return regulation favoured an bigger initial inflow of foreign capital. 
5 We adopt Piggott´s viewpoint, “that CGE models are theoretical models with numbers”.   4
II.  Motivating the use of a general equilibrium model 
 
In order to pick up the interactions between all the sectors of the economy, a 
computable general equilibrium model of the economy seems to be appropriate. The model 
needs to reflect the fact that traditional trade theory guides how we should expect factor 
rewards to respond to commodity price changes under given factor endowments and how 
sector outputs vary with factor endowments changes under constant factor prices. The 
model also needs to reflect the fact that factor mobility assumptions should influence price 
changes. Since this factor mobility is highly specific to the regulated industries, we need to 
model this specificity explicitly and hence we believe that a Ricardo-Viner framework 
provides a useful analytical framework to simulate policy changes.
6 Our main concern is 
that comparative static effects can easily become undetermined when accounting for too 
many factors under the standard assumptions of the model. In particular, since we need to 
model the regulatory rule followed to determine prices in the infrastructure sectors, the net 
effect cannot be determined qualitatively directly. We thus suggest to assess it by  adding 
up numerical (non-linear) impacts. 
We will focus our attention on two questions, qualitative and quantitative 
respectively: (i) is it possible that the regulatory mechanism, mainly the rule for adjusting 
tariffs, biases trade balance and the exchange rate? (ii) If so, can we say that is relevant, not 
negligible, for a typical developing economy like that of Argentina? 
There are two aspects that are relevant for addressing these questions: (i) the 
relative weight of price flexibility with respect to domestic or foreign ownership on trade 
performance, and (ii) the comparative advantage of using more capital or covering the 
excess of marginal cost over tariff with internal resources of the firm. 
We have chosen the Argentine economy to address the second question for several reasons. 
Firstly, Argentina is a country where the process of privatisation has been wide, deep, and 
                                                 
6 Hoque (1997) discusses international trade theorems when there is factor mobility between countries, but 
not between sectors; he finds that international mobility of factors can be seen as a substitute for inter-
sectoral mobility, making valid the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski propositions. See also Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1986).   5
where privatised sectors have a significant role in determining relative prices. Secondly, 
we have the data and we have been able to follow up the gains in productivity and 
efficiency that these sectors experienced. Finally, because Argentina put into practice a rate 
of exchange rule (currency board) that seems to have contributed to the non sustainability 
of the current account, it becomes interesting to know if there were or not other forces (the 
regulatory regime, perhaps?) pushing forward the economy to a dead end. 
III.  The need to model service obligations and restrictions to entry 
To make the model as realistic as possible, it is particularly important to model two of the 
main institutional characteristics of the regulated infrastructure services. The first is the 
fact that since the sectors deliver services which are often perceived as essential to the well 
being of the poorest, contracts signed with private operators generally specify explicit large 
volumes of service obligations.  The second is the fact that in many cases, economies of 
scales are such that there are de-facto restrictions to entry in the sector. In practice this 
restriction is often granted through exclusivity for the right to provide the service, at least 
for a specific duration.  
In the model, service obligation is interpreted as the passive adjustment of services 
supply to demand in the regulated sector. This is a very useful assumption to prevent the 
existence of rationing, but it is also realistic. Most regulatory regimes establish explicitly 
this obligation in the contract, and its violation has not only direct economic costs but also 
hinders on the reputation of the firm. If this assumption were not included, we would need 
to accept some form of rationing of customers (households or firms), and this will make 
the model much more complicated and ad-hoc. Service obligation increases costs to the 
firm (real and expected) and is compensated with the tariff and, very often, with the 
commitment by the regulator of protecting incumbents by legally blocking the entry of 
new competitors. The “no entry” condition guarantees a return on assets, that cannot be 
jeopardized by competitors. 
With the Service Obligation hypothesis, it is possible to consider two contrasting 
alternatives: (i) that the firm will receive a subsidy to cover the difference between   6
marginal cost and regulated price, and  (ii) that there is enough installed capacity to cover 
the necessities of costumers.  
For the first case, we assume that the deficit is covered with a subsidy from the 
shareholders of the firm, in the case of the price-cap regime.  With this strategy, existence 
of equilibrium can be shown using the proofs already available for the standard general 
equilibrium models with taxes. The price-cap or the rate-of-return regulation can be 
interpreted as special mark-up rules that are in fact taxes for which the revenue accrues to 
the owners of the firms
7. For the second case, we will assume later (Section VI) that there 
is available a second technology that uses foreign capital to produce the regulated good. 
This second technology (with constant marginal costs) is used exceptionally when demand 
becomes too high.  This second technology operates as an international given price for 
services and proof of existence of equilibrium is equivalent to the proof used in a model 
with trade (Ricardo-Viner version). 
How will the firm react to a regulatory, technological or market shock? It is 
sensible to say that it will select the minimum cost response and it will prefer the 
alternative technology if it interprets that the shock is not temporary and considers that the 
cost of capital is lower than the subsidization of an old technology. However, we will not 
elaborate more deeply in these arguments, and will concentrate our discussion here on the 
impact for the domestic country of the two solutions. 
We will also assume that government is an ethereal entity that settles the contract 
and regulates firms, but without any other economic activity in the economy. This 
hypothesis, as well the one that the economy does not have neither external debt nor 
unemployment helps to isolate the essential characteristics of the model from interesting 
effects that would make more obscure the causality. 
It has already been mentioned that capital is installed and that we assume that the 
firm faces the tight constraint of service obligation, but that normally this is compensated 
with the protection of incumbents forbidding competitors entry. 
                                                 
7 Shoven and Whalley (1973) give a proof of existence. The natural requirement is that the mark-up function 
were homogenous of degree zero with respect to prices –see Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997)- for a summary of 
the approach.   7
For the sake of clarity, it is better to present a graphical discussion beginning with 
the model of alternative technology. In fact, Graph 1 shows alternative (ii) when demand 
(Da) is low enough as to have excess of installed capacity. PR and qR denote the tariff in 
terms of the numeraire and the production level in the regulated sector, respectively. MC 
represents the marginal cost of the existing technology (the increasing segment) and an 
alternative technology (the constant marginal cost section of the curve), and 1/µ stands for 
the benchmark regulated price.  
 
Graph 1: Non-operative price-cap 
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Given Da,  pR should fall to
0
R p . However, a tax t is imposed (mark-up) to 
compensate owners of capital so that 
1* (1 ) RR p tp +=  = 1/µ. For that (t > 0) to be 
satisfactory for the firm, it must be assumed that demand is inelastic enough. In the case of 
the model we will simulate, since the regulated good is also used as an intermediate input 
for the rest of the economy, substitution in consumption will not prevent that the total 
revenue requirement is reached
8.  
“Tax” revenue are transferred from customers to shareholders of the regulated firm.  
Note that t could be negative as it is shown in Graph 2, that is a subsidy s. If an 
alternative technology does not exist, the firm will continue operating if the additional 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, it can be assumed a LES utility function, with minimum standards of consumption for 
regulated goods.  
MC   8
units (A) marginal costs are covered (triangle S). Since the obligation of service was 
established in the original contract between the regulators and shareholders, we will 
assume that the shareholders cover the excess costs –implicitly in the form of a subsidy to 
the operative management of the firm. This internal subsidy s can be seen in the figure 
below; in this case s is computed so that net price to customers equals the price-cap settled 
at level R p .  
Graph 2: Subsidy and alternative technology 
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In summary, Graph 2 shows the case of an internal subsidy, funded with a tax on 
shareholders of the regulated firm. We will see later that when shareholders are foreign, 
this subsidy will be accompanied by an inflow of capital that reduces the need of foreign 
currency. 
Graph 2 also illustrates the case when the firm has the alternative of importing 
international capital. The incremental cost of the new technology is given by w*A/µ, where 
w* is the foreign factor reward and µ its average productivity. The firm will compare this 
cost with S, to choose the method for servicing the market. However, this will have 
consequences on the current account; if it covers the deficit with the existing technology 
there will be an inflow of capital; instead if the alternative technology is employed, the  
additional reward of foreign factors will impose a burden. 
   9
III.  The structure of the analytical model 
As any standard Ricardo-Viner model, each sector uses two different  category of factors: 
one mobile, labor, and one non mobile, specific capital
9. There are four domestic sectors of 
production (activities): I={1,2,N,R}, two of them are tradable sectors, T={1,2}, and the 
rest are producers of goods and services that are not tradable; sector N produces services 
and sector R represents sectors under regulation. Each activity produces only one 
commodity represented by J={1,2,N,R}. We assume that the utility and production 
functions correspond to the traditional neoclassical version. However, production sectors 
are related through input-output transactions, which play an important role in 
understanding the net impact of regulation on the economy. Prices of tradable goods are 
determined by the rest of the world
10, and domestic agents also import consumption goods 
that are imperfect substitutes of local production. Imports are not used for production. 
The analytical representation of the aggregated regulated sector in this section 
deserves more attention. Though it is natural to think that the production function of that 
sector should exhibit some economies of scale or sub-additivity, we will assume that there 
are not non-convexities once specific capital is installed. This is a simplification with 
obvious theoretical costs, but it also contributes to concentrate our effort in determining the 
impact of regulatory mechanisms and not on the properties of the production set
11. The 
main focus of the paper is in the short run, and when capital is installed the regulated sector 
is ex-post receiving a rent that compensates the initial investment. The alternative 
technology gives some hints on the long run effects; in that case, we assume constant 
returns to scale. 
Domestic household 
We assume that there is an only domestic agent that makes the decision on the 
consumption plan and receives all factor rewards (except for the regulated firm) and 
                                                 
9 A summary of the main characteristics of these models can be found in Bhagwati et al. (2000). 
10 The “small country assumption” in terms of  Kehoe and Kehoe (1994). 
11 Dierker et al (1985) present an analysis of the existence of equilibrium when there are special pricing 
rules.     10
profits. So, we will not be paying attention to personal income distribution matters, though 
we can analyze factor distribution. 
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where θ  is the share of domestic agents in profits of the regulated sector 
*
R π and the last 
term corresponds to the compensatory transfer from domestic customers ( t > 0) or to the 
firm from its shareholders (t < 0). In both cases, under price cap, t is computed so that  pR = 
1/µ(1+t). 
We obtain the familiar first order conditions for a maximum: 
<2> 
''
T cm T m uu pp =                                                                                                                  
<3> 
''
Rm Rm uu pp =  
<4> 
''
Nm Nm uu pp =  
cT is consumption of domestic tradable goods, cR is the consumption of goods and services 
under regulation and m are imports (a good produced abroad but not domestically) and pT, 
pR and pm are their respective prices. w is the wage rate and rI is  the rate of return on 
capital in each sector. L and K represent the domestic agent endowments of labor and 
capital.  
Domestic Production 
F, H and G are the production function of the tradable, non-tradable and regulated sectors, 
respectively. We assume constant returns to scales in all cases. 
i. Tradable  Sectors 
There is one firm that maximizes profits in each tradable sector. The net price for the firm 
is the price to consumers less the cost of intermediate inputs..  
<5>       ,, ,(, ) TT J T J R T R N T N T T T T T T
JT T
p ap ap apF L K w L r K π
≠
 =− − − −−
  ∑∑     11
for every T=1,2. Notice that firms observe the incentive given by the net price after 
intermediate inputs costs. The maximum profit conditions are: 
<6>  ,, , TJ T J R T R N T N L
JT
p ap ap apF w
≠
 −− − =
  ∑  
<7>  ,, , T J TJ R TR N TN K T
JT
p ap ap apF r
≠
 −− − =
  ∑  
In both cases, the value of marginal product (corrected for intermediate costs) is equalized 
to the reward of the factor.   
ii. Non-tradable  Sector 
<8>  ,, (, ) NN T N T R N R N N N N N
T
p apapH L K w L r K π  =− − −−
  ∑  
<9>  ,, NT N T R N R L
T
p apapH w  −− =
  ∑  
<10>  ,, NT N T R N R N N
T
p apapH r  −− =
  ∑  
iii. Regulated  Sector 
As we mentioned above, the regulated firm is treated as a neoclassical firm, and it behaves 
“competitively” though there is no entry. Net price is obtained as the difference between 
the regulated price and intermediate cost. 
<11>  ,, (, ) RR T R T N R N R R R
T
p ap apG L K w L π  =− − −
  ∑  
Notice that in this expression KR is given.  The total rate of return of this sector is 
/ RR R rK π = . The optimal condition for profits is: 
<12>  ,, RT R T N R N L
T
p ap bpG w  −− =
  ∑  
aR,T and aT,R are input-output coefficients used to represent also technical gains due to 
privatization. A reduction in aT,R is an improvement of efficiency internal to the regulated 
firms, which reduces the requirement of intermediate inputs per unit of product. aR,T is a   12
reduction of the requirement of regulated input per unit of tradable output (due to a better 
performance of private operators). 
Foreign Production 
The rest of the world produces substitutes for our exports and import goods, using a factor 
of production F. Equations (16) to (18) give an alternative technology available for foreign 
owners to fulfill their obligation of services, using foreign capital.  
<13> 
** ()
m mm m p Fw F πα =−  
<14> 
** ()
T TT T T p Fw F πβ =−  
<15> 
*
m p w α ′ =  
<16> 
*
TT p w β ′ =  
<17>  ()
s
m mF α =  
<18> ()
s
TT x F β =  
In the case of α’ and  T β ′  constants, international terms of trade will be given by 
Tm T pp α β =  (small economy assumption).  
*
m π and 
*
T π  represent profits in the foreign industries that produce import goods and perfect 
substitutes of tradables. w
*, the numeraire, is the wage rate of the only factor used abroad. 
Fm and FT are factor quantities employed in the corresponding industries. The production 
functions: α(Fm) and βT(FT) give the total supply in equations (16), (17) and (18). 
Foreign Agents 
Foreign consumers receive the rents of foreign factors, including capital installed in the 
regulated sector as well as profits in that sector. It maximizes a utility function 
* (, ) T vx m  
that depends on the consumption of our tradable goods and of import goods. The budget 
condition is:   13
<19> 
** * * (1 ) ( , ) mT T R m T R R R
T
p mp xw F t p G L K θπ π π +=+ −+ + + ∑                                                                          
The foreign agent receives profits and capital return of the regulated sector, as well as the 
wage rate F and the proceedings of the mark-up factor. XT are exports, that is domestic 
tradable goods bought by the foreign agent. The last term in equation <19> stands for the 
endogenous mark-up (positive) or internal subsidy (negative) computed as the difference 
between the benchmark tariff 1/µ (as seen by customers) and  PR  (see section V). 
Market equilibrium conditions 
Equations (20) to (27) represent the equilibrium conditions for factors used domestically, 
and (28) is the equilibrium condition for the foreign factor. Equations (25) to (27) 
correspond to equilibrium in markets for goods: regulated, non regulated and imports.  
<20>  12RN LLLL L =+++ 
<21>         ( 1,2) TT KK T ==  
<22>  NN KK =  
<23>  mT
T
FF F =+ ∑  
<24>  ,, (, ) (, ) (, ) RR R R T T TT R N NN R
T
GL K q a F L K a HL K c += + + ∑  
<25>  ,, (, ) (, ) (, )
s
TT T T T R R R T N N N T T FLK x aG LK a H LK c x += + ++ 
<26>  ,, (, ) (, ) (, ) NN N T T TT N R RR N
T
HL K a F L K a GL K c =+ + ∑  
<27> 
* s mm m =+  
The solution includes determining the endogenous mark-up to cover differences between 
the current tariff and the one defined in the regulation in the price-cap case, i.e.: t such that  
pR  = 1/µ(1+t),  or to cover the difference between the current overall rate of return on 
capital in the regulated sector and its benchmark in the rate-of return case, i.e.: t  such that 
π R/KR = w
*. 
   14
    
Trade Balance 
We can now see how the relation between the mark-up factor (and its mechanism of 
adjustement) and the trade balance arises in the model. From (1): 
/{ } /{ }
 *( , ) I RR II I R R R R
IR IR
p cp c p m w L r K t P G L K θπ θ ++ = ++ + ∑∑  
and since: 
/{ } /{ }
(, ) I RR II I R R R R
IR IR
p cp c p x w L r K t P G L K π ++ = ++ + ∑∑  
* (1 )[ ( , )] RRR R pxp m t p G LK θπ −= − +  
The left hand side is the trade balance and the right hand is the foreign share in regulated 
sector profits.
12 
This equation shows the interlink between the regulatory regime and the trade account. 
However this presentation is too restricted. In fact, domestic ownership is not sufficient to 
break the dilemma;  domestic agents could reveal preference for foreign assets or goods, 
and put pressure on the trade balance anyhow. On the other hand, foreign ownership is not 
necessarily a source of stress on trade surplus, for example if profits are reinvested in the 
country. 
A more general model should include more elaboration on the domestic and foreign agents 
portfolio and investment decisions.  
Simulation of shocks 
In the next section we consider the following shocks for the economy: 
i.  Change in aR,I  in equations (5) and (8) 
A reduction of aR,I could be interpreted as a savings obtained actively by the economy or as 
an improvement of quality of service or goods in the regulated sector supply that helps to 
reduce costs in other sectors. Domestic factors productivity increases and this consents a 
                                                 
12 The trade balance must compensate the current account result. Notice that it is not influenced by entrance 
and exit of capital “in the same period”: the net impact is: - rRKR.   15
reduction of the price of exports or an increase in domestic profits and wages. This in turn 
increases the demand for regulated services and imports. The net effect is not well 
determined ex-ante. 
ii.  Change in aI,R in equation (11) 
Let us assume that regulated services use less inputs per unit of output. In turn, this reduces 
domestic costs through an increase of net supply of tradable goods and should encourage 
exports. However, prices of regulated inputs to domestic producers are only partially 
changed (rate-of-return) or not changed at all (price-cap) depending on the regulatory 
regime. It is expected an increase in domestic profits and in dividends paid abroad; this 
should impact on current account and will require a compensatory surplus in trade balance.  
iii.  Changes in terms of trade 
An increase in the price of exports will foster production at the tradable sector, but the 
overall impact and response could depend on the indexation of critical inputs to the 
changing environment, like regulated goods
13. The final response will depend on the size 
of the tradable sector with respect to the economy and on if the sector is intensive in the 
use of regulated inputs. 
IV.  Results of Simulations with the basic model 
Table IV-1 presents the Social Accounting Matrix of the economy of our basic example. 
Columns represent agents and rows correspond to markets for goods or services. S1 and S2 
are tradable sectors, SN stands for the non-tradable producer, while SR is our aggregate 
regulated industry. HH represents domestic households, and RW indicates the Rest of the 
World “agent”. A positive entry represents a sale and negative one corresponds to a 
purchase or payment of service; budget constraints oblige to balance when adding up the 
                                                 
13 The literature on Dutch Disease shows how the assumptions on mobility and indexation of factor prices 
become crucial for the final results. One interesting aspect of this paper is that it emphasizes the role of the 
rule for determining tariffs in the final industrial structure. Dutch Disease literature focuses in the structure of 
the tradable sector itself, when one of the subsectors experiences a sudden and significant increase in its 
price. See for example Corden and Neary (1982). We explore these effects in the case of Argentina, where 
export sectors are not symmetrical.   16
elements in a column. For example, sector S1 receives 60$ for selling C1, pays to the other 
industries 30$ for inputs, and uses 30$ to reward factors of production. 
Balance must also be fulfilled when adding up elements in a row, in this case because a 
row represents a market and we are assuming that there is equilibrium in the benchmark. 
C1, C2, CN, and CR correspond to goods or services produced by tradable sectors, non-
tradable and regulated industries, respectively. M1 and M2 are imports and L and Ki stand 
for factors of production. If we take the market for each Ki, we see that production sectors 
are contributing with 15$ each to pay for its services, 45$ go to domestic households and 
15$ are dividends to the rest of the world.  
Table IV-1: 
A SAM of a symmetric economy 
S1 S2 SN SR HH RW 
C1  60 -10 -10  -10  -20 -10 
C2  -10 60 -10  -10  -20 -10 
CN  -10 -10  60 -10  -30   
CR  -10 -10 -10 60  -30   
L  -15 -15 -15  -15  60   
K1  -15       15   
K2   -15     15   
KN     -15    15   
KR      -15    15 
M1        -2.5  2.5 
M2        -2.5  2.5 
Source: Own elaboration 
Reduction in the economy requirements of the regulated good. 
Let us consider first the results of assuming that the production sectors are receiving the 
service or good with a better quality. Alternatively, this change could be interpreted as a 
technological progress that reduces the regulated good-intensity of the economy. Notice 
that in any case, the regulated sector is losing relative efficiency to the rest of the economy 
and its relative rate of profit will fall, as well as the demand for the industry; that is the 
reason it would be necessary some kind of compensation. Moreover, there will be   17
increases in nominal wages due to scale effects in manufactures. Domestic welfare
14 
improves, anyhow, because the economy has a windfall gain in productivity. 
   Table IV-2 presents the results of assuming a 25% reduction in coefficient aR,I, 
defined in previous sections. The scenarios represent a regulated firm that continues using 
the same technology but needs some kind of subsidy or compensation to cover deficits. 
Column PL represents a conceptual exercise for a pure walrasian model without regulation. 
Prices are freely determined within the economic process and the results help us to 
understand what is going on in an economy under regulation. Since we have assumed that 
there are no non-convexities, this is the case of a Ricardo-Viner traditional model with 
standard results. Columns PC and RR give the outcomes under price-cap and rate-of-return 
regulation, respectively. 
In this case, when productivity of the economy is improving but the regulated firm 
is left behind, the regulated price should fall; however there are monopolistic rents to 
protect and therefore, we compute an increase in the mark-up (1+t), so that demand price 
remains at its initial level. 
Table IV-2: 
Reduction (25%) in the economy requirements of the regulated good 
PL PC RR 
Domestic Welfare  8.4  8.1  7.2 
Wage rate  6.3  6.1  5.3 
rR 
(3) -8.3  -6.2  0.0 
PR 
(2) -0.5  0.0  1.5 
Exchange Rate
(1) 0.1  0.3  0.9 
Exports -4.1  -2.5  1.9 
X / GDP (16.7%)  14.4  14.7  15.7 
GDP 6.3  6.3  6.2 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price 
cap regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-
tradables and tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
                                                 
14 The welfare changes are computed in terms of the equivalent variation as a percentage of household 
income.   18
Source: Own elaboration 
 
As expected, domestic welfare increases in all cases, though the highest increment is 
observed under full prices adjustment, PL, that is without intervention. We know that this 
is impossible or at least highly improbable, because due to the technology or the size of the 
market, the firm is a monopoly, and we are obliging it to mimic the workings of a 
competitive market. Since one of the fundamental questions of this paper is referred to 
trade performance under different regulatory regimes, we show in the table the 
performance of exports. Total exports diminish relative to the benchmark and this is due to 
a fall in the regulated industry profits: demand for regulated goods now is lower than 
initially and the wage rate is higher. 
Let us compare now these results with the PC solution. Under this solution, the price to the 
firm must be pushed back to its initial level in terms of foreign currency. This is 
accomplished, in terms of the model, with an additional tax or mark-up increase that is 
paid by domestic customers to the firm; dividends are sent to foreign shareholders, and this 
obliges the country to improve its trade balance (now, exports are reduced less than in the 
case of flexible prices). Domestic welfare is increasing less than in the case of flexible 
prices, PL. 
The welfare improvement is still lower under rate-of-return regulation, RR. In this case, the 
mark up is moved up to restore the rate of return of capital to its initial level, given in terms 
of the numeraire (foreign currency). Since prices and  profits of the regulated sector were 
falling, the additional mark up compensates regulated capital and therefore the same 
amount of dividends can be sent to shareholders. Notice that exports grow and this is due 
to the restoration of the mentioned flow of dividends. In fact, incentives to export are not 
inducing a reallocation of resources to export industries; non-tradable goods are 
appreciating in all scenarios with respect to tradable. 
Though these exercises are interesting themselves, they do not put the accent in the trade-
off between controlling bad performance of the agent and having a good macroeconomic 
performance for the principal. The reason is that parameter aR,I is not necessarily a variable   19
under control of the agent, or that it is not internalized by the firm, and we must explore 
changes in aI,R.  
Efficiency gains within the regulated industry. 
The efficiency gains in the regulated sector can be captured through reductions of aI,R, the 
coefficient that represents inputs requirements from the rest of the economy, or by 
reductions in labor requirements per unit of output. Table IV-3 shows the results of 
assuming a 25% reduction of aI,R. This is an internal gain of the regulated firm
15, normally 
expected as the result of a high-powered regulatory mechanism (price-cap).  
A very interesting result is that domestic total welfare is not increased the most 
under PL, but under RR. The reason is that there is an efficiency gain obtained by the firm, 
but it is not allowed to keep it as part of its rate of return and it is fully transferred to 
domestic households and producers in the form of a price reduction. There is a pass-
through from foreign agents to domestic agents
16. 
Table IV-3: 
Efficiency gains (25%) within the regulated industry 
PL PC  RR 
Domestic Welfare  5.3  -0.3  7.4 
Wage rate  4.2  -1.0  6.2 
rR 
(3) 14.7  51.6  0.0 
PR 
(2) -7.9  0.0  -10.7 
Exchange Rate
(1) -4.2  -1.0  -5.3 
Exports 11.7  38.6  1.0 
X / GDP (16.7%)  17.4  21.7  15.8 
GDP 6.7  6.3  6.6 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price cap 
regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-tradables and 
tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
                                                 
15 Simulations considering efficiency loss of the same magnitude gave similar results but with the opposite 
sign.  
16 Owners of the firm will not necessarily have incentives to introduce the efficiency gains, however.   20
Exports performance exhibits dramatic differences: under PC exports must grow 
more that 38% while under RR, they almost do not react (they grow only 1%) because 
there is not outflow of dividends. Long run incentives to exports seem to be stronger under 
RR, quite close to PL. PN/PT is lower under RR than under PC. 
We can give the following conjecture (obtained from an example; though general, 
an example still) as a corollary of this discussion. PC gives incentives to improve 
efficiency; once obtained, the macroeconomic performance of the economy (particularly 
regarding the trade balance) could be satisfactory (because of the increase of exports). 
But, though PC could give the impression of fostering relatively exports more than RR, that 
could simply be the result of a passive adjustment to movements in the capital account. 
This arises a dramatic question: will the economy be able to open enough to cover the 
capital account deficit?. In fact, relative prices favor more exports under RR and PL than 
under PC, because PN/PT falls and tradable sectors find domestic costs lower. PC gives the 
impression of pushing exports, but  RR replicates better the workings of a fully flexible 
economy, and though export performance is not that brilliant it establishes more sensible 
long run prices adjustments. 
Increase in price of exports.  
Table IV-4 shows the results of assuming a 10% increase in the price of one of export 
goods. In this case, the selection of the export sector is neutral due to symmetry. Under PL, 
welfare of domestic households increases though total exports are reduced; the reason is 
that the price of the second export industry stays behind not only of the other export good, 






   21
Table IV-4: 
Increase in price of exports (10%) 
PL PC  RR 
Domestic Welfare  0.4 4.1  1.1 
Wage rate  5.4 9.5  6.1 
rR 
(3)  5.3 -22.6 0.0 
PR 
(2)  0.2 -4.8  -0.9 
Exchange Rate
(1)  0.2 -1.5  -0.2 
Exports  -3.9 -22.5 -7.5 
X / GDP (16.7%)  16.0 12.9  15.4 
GDP  0.3 0.3  0.3 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price cap 
regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-tradables 
and tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
PC will give the highest improvement for domestic welfare, because there is an increase in 
domestic costs, specially the wage rate, and the increment of costs cannot be passed to 
customers; instead they are absorbed by shareholders reducing the flow of dividends 
abroad or increasing the inflow of “subsidies” to the firm by their owners. 
V.  Simulations for the Argentine economy. 
Table V-1 presents the Social Accounting Matrix of an economy that replicates the main 
features of the Argentine economy as of 1997
17. We have left aside financial transactions, 
as well as government and imperfections, such as unemployment.  
What the matrix does, after that purification, is to show the relative intensity in the use of 
factors, the burden given by the dividends to be paid abroad and the relative weight of the 
regulated sector in total GDP. 
                                                 
17 Considering the information available from National Accounts and Input-Output estimations (INDEC, 
2001)   22
Regulated sectors represent about 10% of total GDP and total dividends paid abroad are 
estimated as 3% of GDP. We can see that Industry, Sector 2, is the heavier user of 
regulated sector products and services, followed by non-tradable sectors. Ownership of 
regulated firms is not concentrated in foreign agents as we assumed in the example; in fact, 
the profit tax (35%) itself explains why such assumption would not be tenable; our best 
approximation is θ   = 0.5, in terms of the model of Section III. 
Table V-1:  
A SAM based on Argentina (1997) 
 S1 S2 SN SR HH RW 
C1  13.2 -8.9 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2 -2.9 
C2  -2.2 50.1 -8.0 -2.2  -28.6  -9.2 
CN  -1.2 -9.0 82.8 -3.1 -69.5     
CR  -0.5 -4.5 -4.1 17.8 -8.7     
L  -2.3 -11.0  -31.2 -5.0 49.5     
K1  -7.1      7.1  
K2   -16.7    16.7  
KN     -39.3    39.3   
KR      -7.4  3.7  3.7 
M1              -0.3  0.3 
M2       -8.1  8.1 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table V-2, Table V-3 and Table V-4 correspond one-to-one to the simulations performed 
in the previous section. General results respond to the same pattern we observed in the 
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Table V-2:  
Reduction (25%) in the economy requirements of the regulated good 
PL PC RR 
Domestic Welfare  3.0  2.2  2.5 
Wage rate  4.1  1.6  2.3 
rR 
(3) -17.0  5.9  0.0 
PR 
(2) -10.0  0.0  -2.7 
Exchange Rate
(1) 0.7  1.4  1.2 
Exports -2.1  4.3  2.7 
X / GDP (10%)  9.6  10.2  10.0 
GDP 2.3  2.2  2.3 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price 
cap regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-
tradables and tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Overall changes in GDP are lower than in Table IV-2: given the same magnitude 
for every shock. The reason is that the regulated sector share in GDP is also smaller than in 
the case of the symmetric economy we presented above. However, total changes are still 
important for, in the case of efficiency, they amount to 2% of GDP. 
PL still represents a reference without correlation to reality, because we have 
admitted that regulated sectors technology and market structure would not consent the 
functioning of a competitive solution. Ideally, this rule should give the maximum total 
welfare improvements. 
Accordingly, PL maximizes the domestic welfare change when the economy is 
experiencing an improvement of efficiency (Table V-2), but that is not true when the 
regulated sector is gaining efficiency (Table V-3). In fact, in the second case, the RR 
regime (rate of return fixed in foreign currency) increases welfare more than PL because 
the excessive profits are transferred to domestic customers via a reduction of price
18. 
Remember that we are quoting domestic welfare in the Tables, and the proposition that 
                                                 
18 They become implicit shareholders who have to cover also the increase in wage rate.   24
welfare improves the most under flexible prices would be shown true if we added up 
domestic and foreign welfare. 
Table V-3:   
Efficiency gains (25%) within the regulated industry 
PL PC  RR 
Domestic Welfare  1.7  0.9  1.9 
Wage rate  1.6  -1.2  2.1 
rR 
(3) 4.4  29.3  0.0 
PR 
(2) -9.4  0.0  -11.0 
Exchange Rate
(1) -1.1  -0.7  -1.1 
Exports 2.4  9.3  1.2 
X / GDP (10%)  10.1  10.7  10.0 
GDP 1.8  1.8  1.7 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price cap 
regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-tradables 
and tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Exports do not augment in the same proportion under RR than under PC because 
dividends are smaller and the domestic propensity to import is less than one. PC is more 
demanding of a domestic effort to repay the initial investment in the privatized sectors; in 
fact, the required increments under PC are very significant for Argentina: around 9%. This 
puts high pressure on the economy, not used to accessing easily international markets. The 
necessary increments under any of the rate-of-return adjustment mechanisms are much 
more modest, between 1 and 2%. 
Though it is true that PC incentives efficiency, from the point of view of welfare 
improvement and exports effort, the domestic society could have reasons to adopt a low-
powered incentive scheme when the efficiency gains are expected within the privatized 
sector.  
   Table V-4 illustrates the relevance of relative factor intensity for increases in price 
of exports. It shows the results of assuming a 10% increase in international prices of export 
primary goods and in international prices of export industrial goods. The impact on wages   25
is different because primary goods do not use labor intensively. In fact, when primary 
goods price goes up, wages fall in terms of foreign currency (remember that we are 
assuming nor unemployment neither wage rigidities) though they grow in terms of non-
tradable goods (the most labor-intensive sector of the economy). 
  There are no significant differences due to the regulatory regime, when it is primary 
exports prices that are increased, all of them imply a reduction in total exports. Exports fall 
because there is substitution of value added manufactured goods for raw primary exports.  
Table V-4:   
Increase in price of exports 
10% Increase in price of  
primary exports 
10% Increase in price of industrial 
exports   
PL PC RR  PL PC RR 
Domestic Welfare  0.3  0.2  0.3  -0.2 0.6 0.1 
Wage rate  -1.0  -1.3  -1.2  11.1 14.7 12.4 
rR 
(3) -1.7  1.2  0.0  11.7 -20.8  0.0 
PR 
(2) -3.4  -2.3  -2.8  3.2 -7.1 -0.7 
Exchange Rate
(1) -3.2  -3.1  -3.1  3.1 2.7 2.9 
Exports -4.0  -3.2  -3.6  2.2 -6.0 -0.8 
X / GDP (10%)  9.6  9.7  9.6  10.3 9.4  10.0 
GDP 0.4  0.4  0.4  -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). PL: Walrasian model, PC: model with price cap 
regulation, RR: model with Rate of Return regulation.(1) Exchange Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-tradables and 
tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR .total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
It is also important to take into account the relative size –see Table 6- of the 
sectors: industry represents a higher proportion of total exports (considering primary 
manufactured goods as industrial). Notice that total welfare is being reduced in PL, but this 
does not take into account the gains of foreign shareholders of privatized firms; under PC, 
when the regulated price is prevented from growing, the welfare improvement for domestic 
agents is maximum.     26
But it is also significant the difference in terms of welfare improvement under 
different regulatory regimes. We can see that the higher increase in domestic welfare is 
achieved under PC. This is due to the fact that the regulated price should grow but it is 
limited by the cap, and since domestic prices are going up (specially because non-tradable 
goods are highly demanded by industry) the regulated firm is experiencing a shrinking of 
profits.  
There are also several interesting comparative effects of the increase of prices of 
primary and industrial goods. The first implies a reduction of the price of non-tradable 
goods relative to tradable; the exchange rate is under-appreciated, and that appreciation is 
independent of the regulatory regime. Primary sectors are not intensive users of regulated 
goods and services. The situation is the opposite when it is manufactures export prices that 
are increased; the exchange rate depreciates because there is an increase in domestic 
demand for non-tradable goods
19.  
VI.  An appraisal of the long-run solution 
To represent the workings of the price-cap we have considered an alternative way 
for modeling service obligation. We have the case of a firm that has an alternative 
technology that substitutes local technology. The firm will choose the less costly between 
the internal subsidy or the alternative technology.  This new investment could influence 
trade balance. However, notice that the net effect of the initial inflow and the final outflow 
(assumed to happen in the same period) is simply the opportunity cost of foreign capital.  
Table VI-1 presents the results of a reduction of efficiency of the firm. In this case 
we allow the firm to use a second technology to compensate the cost increase. Since aI,R is 
a parameter under control of the regulated firm, the decision on how to cover deficits of the 
firm is in its shareholders´ hands, and it should be expected that they will choose the 
                                                 
19 The simulations show also evidence of Dutch Disease, in terms of activity levels of tradable sectors that 
are not benefiting from price increases. In both cases, resources are reallocated to the booming sector and this 
implies reduction of the activity level of the other export industry. Corden and Neary (1982) consider two 
effects of a boom, a “resource movement effect” and a “spending effect”, referred to the drawing of resources 
from the rest of the economy and to the extra spending due to higher real income.   
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minimum cost strategy. This is specially important for the case of a loss of efficiency, for 
the firm could substitute the local methods for imported capital.   
The use of a second technology can be cheaper but implies dividends outflows. 
This can be compared with the same exercise but financing the difference between the 
price cap and the marginal cost through a monetary contribution form shareholders 
(columns SU). 
  T a b l e   V I - 1 :    
Efficiency loss 25% within the regulated industry in a model with price-cap regulation 
Symmetric Model  Argentine Model 
NT SU NT  SU 
Domestic Welfare  -0.9  0.4  -1.0  -0.9 
Wage rate  -6.1  1.1  -2.7  1.4 
rR 
(3) -38.9  -53.1  -25.7  -32.7 
PR 
(2) 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Exchange Rate
(1) -0.9  1.1  -1.3  0.8 
Exports 34.9  -39.6  13.0  -10.3 
X / GDP (16.7% / 10.0%)  23.6  10.8  11.5  9.2 
GDP -4.6  -6.4  -1.6  -2.0 
N.B.: changes in percentage levels, except for X/GDP (benchmark in brackets). SU Subsidy, NT: New Tecnology. (1) Exchange 
Rate: weighted average price ratio between non-tradables and tradables (PN/PT); (2) PR:Price of the regulated service; (3)  rR 
.total rate of return of the regulated service 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In the Argentine case, under PC, the firm experiences a lower loss when the second 
technology is introduced ( -26% instead of –33%) but that is a bad solution for the 
economy because in the second case exports have to grow 13%, while in the first solution 
exports can fall!  
The solution with an internal subsidy gives an illusory increase in welfare too 
(symmetric model). The economy is less productive, but the problem is covered by the 
shareholders who agree to subsidize the firm operation. This capital inflow helps to relax 
exports and leaves more goods in the hands of domestic households. There is no doubt that 
that solution is transitory; and it is clear that it cannot last too much.  With respect to the   28
long run incentives to export, the SU solution is harmful since relative price of tradable to 
non-tradable goods is falling. 
VII. Final  remarks 
The problem of regulation encompasses the trade off between risk sharing and 
asymmetric information costs. 
The choice between low and high-powered incentive regimes depends therefore on 
the relative weight of  those elements on expected benefits and on the social costs ; the 
latter stem mainly from the distortion introduced in the economy when the regulated firm 
is subsidized with more taxes. 
This paper helps to understand that: 
 
1.  Those costs may underestimate the true costs if  international trade, the relation of 
the economy with the rest of the world, is not taken into account. 
2.  In this vein, the capital account and the rate of exchange regime could be key 
elements to select the regulatory regime. For example, a currency board regime (or 
the lack of domestic opportunities for profits reinvestment)  could be too 
demanding on the trade account under a pure price-cap regime. That is, the 
potential inconsistency between the international trade regime and the regulatory 
regime should not be rejected a priori.   
3.  There are also obvious differences between the short and the long run adjustments, 
and this has to be taken into account to evaluate the impact of temporary or 
permanent shocks. For example, a loss of comparative efficiency of the regulated 
sector could be faced with the same technology or with new investments; the first 
solution puts less pressure on the trade performance of the host country.  
4.  The response to an increase in industrial exports prices should be an increase in 
exports;  however a price-cap regime could reverse that expected reaction.  The 
booming of exporting industries increases domestic prices of inputs and factors; the 
regulated firm sees an increase in costs and a reduction of profits, reducing the 
pressure on the capital account, as well as on the necessary trade surplus. 
 
To address these issues we have worked both with a simulated theoretical model and 
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  Reduction (25%) in the 
economy requirements 
of the regulated good 
Efficiency gain (25%) 
within the regulated 
industry  
Increase in price of 
manufacturing exports 
(10%)  
Exports  (SYM) RR > PC > PL 
(ARG) PC > RR > PL 
(SYM) PC > PL > RR 
(ARG) PC > PL > RR 
(SYM) PL > RR > PC 
(ARG) PL > RR > PC 
Incentives to exports  (SYM) PL > PC > RR 
(ARG) PL > RR > PC 
(SYM) RR > PL > PC 
(ARG) RR > PL > PC 
(SYM) PC > RR > PL 
(ARG) PC > RR > PL 
Domestic welfare  (SYM) PL > PC > RR 
(ARG) PL > RR > PC 
(SYM) RR > PL > PC 
(ARG) RR > PL > PC 
(SYM) PC > RR > PL 
(ARG) PC > RR > PL 
 
In the table above we are comparing the performance of the different regimes with respect 
to exports, exchange rate (incentives to exports) and domestic welfare in the cases of a 
symmetric economy (SYM) and of the Argentine economy (ARG). 
One interesting thing is that SYM and ARG effects are similar in the case of and efficiency 
gain internal to the firm. That is, factor intensity differences among sectors are not relevant 
for the qualitative performance of regulatory regimes.  
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